

The Case for Reinstating the Tariff on Steel Imports Act. An Economic Analysis

Vernon M. Corralling* and Philip G. Gavett†

Under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA)

and the US–EU Trade Policy, we examine the economic effects of the CDSOA on the European Union (EU). We find that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's import market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to import from the EU rather than from the United States.

We also find that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's export market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to export to the EU rather than to the United States.

We conclude that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's import market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to import from the EU rather than from the United States.

We also find that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's export market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to export to the EU rather than to the United States.

We conclude that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's import market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to import from the EU rather than from the United States.

We also find that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's export market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to export to the EU rather than to the United States.

We conclude that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's import market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to import from the EU rather than from the United States.

We also find that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's export market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to export to the EU rather than to the United States.

We conclude that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's import market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to import from the EU rather than from the United States.

We also find that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's export market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to export to the EU rather than to the United States.

We conclude that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's import market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to import from the EU rather than from the United States.

We also find that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's export market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to export to the EU rather than to the United States.

We conclude that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's import market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to import from the EU rather than from the United States.

We also find that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's export market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to export to the EU rather than to the United States.

We conclude that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's import market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to import from the EU rather than from the United States.

We also find that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's export market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to export to the EU rather than to the United States.

We conclude that the CDSOA would have little effect on the EU's import market if the current equilibrium. This is because companies will find it profitable to import from the EU rather than from the United States.



'will respond by reducing their own output.' As reduction in firms' output is not



own country, then q_2 represents the amount of exports from each foreign firm to the U.S. market. Inverse market demand function in the U.S. is represented by $\gamma = (\Omega_1 + \Omega_2)$, where, $\Omega_1 = \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i$ and $\Omega_2 = \beta + \sigma$. We assume that all firms have the same cost function.

It is assumed that the government does not discriminate between foreign and domestic firms. Thus, the government's objective function is given by $\pi = \pi_1 + \pi_2$, where $\pi_1 = \pi_1(q_1, q_2)$ and $\pi_2 = \pi_2(q_1, q_2)$. The government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 + \pi_2 = \pi$. The government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 + \pi_2 = \pi$.

We set up the model under two regimes. One regime is the individual dumping regime, where the government keeps all the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 1, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi$. The other regime is the GDSO regime, where the government retains a fixed percentage of the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 2, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi - \pi_2$.

We consider two cases. In the first case, we assume that the government retains a fixed percentage of the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 2, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi - \pi_2$. The second case is the individual dumping regime, where the government keeps all the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 1, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi$.

We consider two cases. In the first case, we assume that the government retains a fixed percentage of the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 2, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi - \pi_2$. The second case is the individual dumping regime, where the government keeps all the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 1, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi$.

We consider two cases. In the first case, we assume that the government retains a fixed percentage of the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 2, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi - \pi_2$. The second case is the individual dumping regime, where the government keeps all the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 1, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi$.

We consider two cases. In the first case, we assume that the government retains a fixed percentage of the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 2, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi - \pi_2$. The second case is the individual dumping regime, where the government keeps all the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 1, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi$.

We consider two cases. In the first case, we assume that the government retains a fixed percentage of the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 2, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi - \pi_2$. The second case is the individual dumping regime, where the government keeps all the revenues from the sales of foreign firms. As such, under regime 1, the government's budget constraint is given by $\pi_1 = \pi$.

variables are set to 0 times, we adopt the notation convention that variables with a hat belong to



tion 51 reveals that an increase in foreign investment will reduce the output of domestic firms.

The effect of a change in the foreign investment subsidy on the output of domestic firms is given by the following proposition:

Proposition 52: The effect of a change in the foreign investment subsidy on the output of domestic firms can be expressed as

$$\frac{\partial Q}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \alpha^F} \cdot \frac{\partial \alpha^F}{\partial \alpha} + \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \alpha^D} \cdot \frac{\partial \alpha^D}{\partial \alpha}$$

$$\alpha^F - \alpha^D$$



also the case when $\alpha < \beta$.
In general, as α increases, the effect of a shift in policy regime becomes more pronounced.
The following proposition summarizes the results.

PROPOSITION 2. *Suppose there is a shift in policy regime from regime 1 to regime 2. Then*

- (a) *if $\alpha > \beta$, then π_1^* decreases and π_2^* increases. In addition, if $\alpha > \beta + \gamma$, then $\pi_1^* < \pi_2^*$.*
- (b) *if $\alpha = \beta$, then $\pi_1^* = \pi_2^*$.*
- (c) *if $\alpha < \beta$, then π_1^* increases and π_2^* decreases. In addition, if $\alpha < \beta - \gamma$, then $\pi_1^* > \pi_2^*$.*

PROPOSITION 2. Summary of Results *Suppose there is a shift in policy regime from regime 1 to regime 2. Then*

(a) *if $\alpha > \beta$, then π_1^* decreases and π_2^* increases. In addition, if $\alpha > \beta + \gamma$, then $\pi_1^* < \pi_2^*$.*

(b) *if $\alpha = \beta$, then $\pi_1^* = \pi_2^*$.*

(c) *if $\alpha < \beta$, then π_1^* increases and π_2^* decreases. In addition, if $\alpha < \beta - \gamma$, then $\pi_1^* > \pi_2^*$.*

Proof. The proof follows from the fact that π_1^* and π_2^* are concave functions of π_1 and π_2 respectively. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1.

Corollary 1. *Suppose there is a shift in policy regime from regime 1 to regime 2. If $\alpha > \beta$, then $\pi_1^* < \pi_2^*$. If $\alpha < \beta$, then $\pi_1^* > \pi_2^*$.*

Proof. This follows directly from the fact that π_1^* and π_2^* are concave functions of π_1 and π_2 respectively. The proof is similar to that of Corollary 1 of Proposition 1.

Corollary 2. *Suppose there is a shift in policy regime from regime 1 to regime 2. If $\alpha > \beta$, then $\pi_1^* < \pi_2^*$. If $\alpha < \beta$, then $\pi_1^* > \pi_2^*$.*

Proof. This follows directly from the fact that π_1^* and π_2^* are concave functions of π_1 and π_2 respectively. The proof is similar to that of Corollary 2 of Proposition 1.

Corollary 3. *Suppose there is a shift in policy regime from regime 1 to regime 2. If $\alpha > \beta$, then $\pi_1^* < \pi_2^*$. If $\alpha < \beta$, then $\pi_1^* > \pi_2^*$.*

Proof. This follows directly from the fact that π_1^* and π_2^* are concave functions of π_1 and π_2 respectively. The proof is similar to that of Corollary 3 of Proposition 1.

Corollary 4. *Suppose there is a shift in policy regime from regime 1 to regime 2. If $\alpha > \beta$, then $\pi_1^* < \pi_2^*$. If $\alpha < \beta$, then $\pi_1^* > \pi_2^*$.*

Proof. This follows directly from the fact that π_1^* and π_2^* are concave functions of π_1 and π_2 respectively. The proof is similar to that of Corollary 4 of Proposition 1.

maximize their profits in the new régime; they must reduce it.

It is not surprising that the Japanese government has chosen to ignore the findings of its own investigation. It has consistently refused to accept the findings of the World Trade Organization's dispute panels in cases involving dumping and subsidies by Japan. It has also consistently rejected the recommendations of the International Labour Organization's Committee of Experts on the Application of the Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organization, which found that Japanese labor standards were failing to meet international norms. In fact, the Japanese government has been instrumental in blocking the implementation of ILO recommendations. This is a clear indication that the Japanese government is not interested in addressing the concerns raised by the US government.

It is also important to note that the Japanese government has not taken any steps to address the concerns raised by the US government.

Government lowers the tariff revenue, and then we consider

the time trend

of import tariff rates, of imports of similar products, and of exports of similar products.

$$\Delta S = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{(U_1 p_{12} - v_1)^2 + (U_2 p_{12} - v_2)^2}{(U_1 + U_2)/2} \right]^{1/2} \quad (2)$$

w

6

I

∞

=

25

8

so that ΔS is approximately 18.

$$d = (\pi^{B_2})^T \gamma - \pi^B(k^T f(A))$$

■

25

8

so that d is approximately 18.

Thus, the estimated effect of a 1% increase in the import tariff rate is approximately 18%.

Finally, we estimate the effect of a 1% increase in the export tariff rate. We find that the estimated effect is approximately 18%.

Thus, the estimated effect of a 1% increase in the export tariff rate is approximately 18%.

Thus, the estimated effect of a 1% increase in the export tariff rate is approximately 18%.

© 2007 Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. All rights reserved. The Toyota logo is a registered trademark of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. The Toyota name and the Toyota logo are used under license from Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

www.nexis.com

10. The following table shows the number of hours worked by 100 employees in a company. Calculate the mean, median, mode, and range.

www.mechanicsoul.com

Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

Wingay w ☐

www.wanhu.org

www.nature.com/scientificreports/

 [View Details](#)

A horizontal black and white checkered pattern, likely a calibration target or a decorative element at the bottom of the page.

and the corresponding values of the parameters are given in Table 1.

www.ijerph.org

[View Details](#) | [Edit](#) | [Delete](#)



FIGURE 1. Earnings ratio given by

and the following equation may be derived:

and

$$\frac{d}{dQ} \ln Q = \frac{1}{Q} - \frac{1}{Q^2} + \frac{1}{Q^3} - \frac{1}{Q^4} + \dots$$

⁶ The U.S. government's standards of the CDSFA does not allow for increased competition among firms in the same industry. This is due to the fact that the CDSFA does not allow for the application of the Federal Trade Commission's standard of trustworthiness or soundness.

⁷ Appendix 2 says "it was not necessary that the CDSFA make explicit reference to an industry institution specifically designed to regulate oligopolistic firms in the industry."

⁸ See Part I, section 1002(c)(1).

⁹ We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this important issue.

Given that $c_1 = c_2 + \epsilon$, the two equations are symmetric, and we only need to consider one quadrant.


perfectly competitive equilibrium: $\hat{a}_1 = \hat{a}_2 = \hat{a}$. Furthermore, since $\hat{a}^2 - \hat{P}^2 = D_1$, we

2

equilibrium occurs at

$$\hat{P} = c_1 = 0$$





As $\lambda \rightarrow 0$, since $t \in (0, \infty)$ then the sign of $t\lambda - \nu(\eta_1, \eta_2, M_1, M_2 + M(M_2))$ only depends on the sign of ν . Thus, $t\lambda - \nu$

is non-negative if and only if $\nu > 0$ and non-positive if and only if $\nu < 0$.

Therefore, if $\nu > 0$ then $t\lambda - \nu(\eta_1, \eta_2, M_1, M_2 + M(M_2)) \geq 0$ for all $t \in (0, \infty)$ and if $\nu < 0$ then $t\lambda - \nu(\eta_1, \eta_2, M_1, M_2 + M(M_2)) \leq 0$ for all $t \in (0, \infty)$.

□

□

□

□

□

EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES

$$(m_1 - \nu)(M_1(M_1^2 + 2M_2 + M_2^2) + m_2^2 + m_2(m_2 - \frac{m_1}{m_1}) \geq 0 \quad (\frac{m_1}{m_1} - \frac{m_2}{m_2})(2m_2 + 2M_2) + 2(M_2 + m_1m_2).$$

Multiplying both sides of the inequality by m_1m_2 , it yields

□

(C₁) is still satisfied but $x < 0$. We would still have

$$(m_1 - \nu)(M_1(M_1^2 + 2M_2 + M_2^2) + m_2^2 + m_2(m_2 - \frac{m_1}{m_1}) \geq 0 \quad (\frac{m_1}{m_1} - \frac{m_2}{m_2})(2m_2 + 2M_2) + 2(M_2 + m_1m_2).$$

□

□

□



Home firms' marginal revenue profit is given as

$$\begin{aligned} (\hat{\pi}_1 - \hat{c}_1)Q_1 &= \frac{(\alpha M_1 \tilde{M}_{11} + M_1 c_1 + M_2 c_2 + t M_{11})}{1 - \frac{M_1 + M_2 + M_1 M_2}{M_1^2 + M_2^2 + M_1 M_2}} + \frac{M_2 \tilde{M}_{12}(\alpha - \hat{c}_1)}{M_1^2 + M_2^2 + M_1 M_2} \\ &= M_1 \left[\frac{M_2(\alpha - \hat{c}_1) + \hat{t} - c_1 - \hat{c}_2}{M_{11} + M_{22} + M_1 M_2} \right]^2. \end{aligned}$$

Total welfare is $\hat{W} = \hat{S} + (\hat{\pi}_1 - \hat{c}_1)\hat{Q}_1 + \hat{t}\hat{Q}_2$.

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{W} &= \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{M_1(\alpha - \hat{c}_1 - \hat{t}) + M_2(\alpha - \hat{c}_1)}{1 - \frac{M_1 + M_2 + M_1 M_2}{M_1^2 + M_2^2 + M_1 M_2}} \right] + \frac{M_2(\alpha - \hat{c}_1) + \hat{t} - c_1}{M_1^2 + M_2^2 + M_1 M_2} \\ &\quad + \frac{\hat{t}[M_2(\alpha - \hat{c}_1 - \hat{t}) - c_1 - \hat{c}_2]}{M_{11} + M_{22} + M_1 M_2}. \end{aligned}$$

Optimal tariff is obtained by computing $\frac{\partial \hat{W}}{\partial \hat{t}} = 0$, and \hat{t}^* is defined as

$$\hat{t}^* = \frac{(\alpha - \hat{c}_2)(M_1^2 M_{11} + M_2^2 M_1) - c_1(M_1^2 M_{11} + M_1^2 M_2)}{2M_{11} + 4M_1 M_2 + M_1^2 + 2M_1^2 M_2}.$$

A.7.2. Regime 2:

Assumptions on outputs are

$$\begin{aligned} Q_1 &= \frac{\alpha M_1}{M_1 + M_2 + M_1 M_2} \quad \text{if } \alpha M_1 > M_1 c_1 + M_2 c_2 + t \\ Q_1 &= \frac{\alpha M_1 - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t}{M_1 + M_2 + M_1 M_2} \quad \text{if } \alpha M_1 \leq M_1 c_1 + M_2 c_2 + t \\ Q_2 &= \frac{\alpha M_2}{M_1 + M_2 + M_1 M_2} \quad \text{if } \alpha M_2 > M_1 c_1 + M_2 c_2 + t \\ Q_2 &= \frac{\alpha M_2 - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t}{M_1 + M_2 + M_1 M_2} \quad \text{if } \alpha M_2 \leq M_1 c_1 + M_2 c_2 + t \end{aligned}$$

Total output is

$$Q_1 + Q_2 = \frac{\alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2)}{M_1 + M_2 + M_1 M_2}.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal cost} &= M_1 c_1 + M_2 c_2 + t \\ \text{Marginal revenue} &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal profit} &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal profit} &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal profit} &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal profit} &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal profit} &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal profit} &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal profit} &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal profit} &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \\ &= \alpha M_1 + \alpha M_2 + c_1 + c_2 - (1 + M_1 M_2)t + \hat{t} + \hat{t} M_2 / (1 + M_1 M_2) - M_1 c_1 - M_2 c_2 - t \end{aligned}$$

Total vigilance

$$w^{\tilde{n}} = \delta^{\tilde{n}} + (F^{\tilde{n}} - c_1) \tilde{Y}^{\tilde{n}} + i \tilde{Q}^{\tilde{n}} \\ + \left[M_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) + M_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) \tilde{Y}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}} \right]^2 + \left[M_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) + Q_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) \right] \tilde{Y}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}}$$

$$+ \left[M_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) + Q_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) \right] \tilde{Q}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}} + \left[M_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) + Q_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) \right]^2 \tilde{Y}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}} \tilde{Q}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}}$$

$$+ \left[M_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) + Q_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) \right] \tilde{Y}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}} \tilde{Q}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}} + \left[M_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) + Q_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) \right]^2 \tilde{Q}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}} \tilde{Y}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}}$$

$$+ \left[M_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) + Q_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) \right]^2 \tilde{Y}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}} \tilde{Q}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}} + \left[M_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) + Q_{\tilde{n}}(c_1 + c_2 \tilde{n}) \right]^2 \tilde{Q}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}} \tilde{Y}_{\tilde{n}}^{\tilde{n}}$$

References

- Andersen, L. (1992). Double-blind model of springtime expectancies. *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 48, 82-85.
- * Andersen, James E. (1992). *Expectancy matching in anti-dumping: solutions or ineffectiveness?* 22, 59.